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The PAWCER Project
The ERA.Net RUS Plus initiative, funded by the EU 
7th Framework, aims at enhancing the coordination 
of research programmes between the EU Member 
States and Associated Countries, and Russia 
(www.era.net-rus.eu). In 2015, the initiative funded 
the PAWCER project, which is a comparative 
research project on Public Attitudes to Welfare, 
Climate Change and Energy in the EU and Russia. 
PAWCER aims to contribute to the knowledge 
about contemporary Russian and European 
societies in two ways: it facilitates the participation 
of Russia in the eighth round of the European 
Social Survey (ESS), and it supports comparative 
analysis, with a particular focus on how Russian 
attitudes contrast with those elsewhere in Europe 
on various topics. This top-line report is produced 
within the frames of Work Package 3 of PAWCER, 
which is titled Welfare Attitudes under Changing 
Circumstances: Solidarities under Pressure.
Background
Europe and Russia have a long common history. 
Over time, a great number of different nations 
have evolved and dissolved in these regions, 
each developing their own cultural backgrounds, 
institutions and values. The relations between Russia 
and Europe, or European countries, have not been 
without conflicts stemming from various cultural 
(e.g., different attitudes and values) and structural 
(e.g., competition for resources) differences. Such 
sources of conflict can also interact. 
However, roads to peace can arise and be 
developed from cultural and structural sources 
as well. Hence, in order to understand past and 
present conflicts–as well as to find ways to build a 
shared identity and foster mutual understanding in 
order to prevent potential future conflicts–among 
other things knowledge about public opinion in 
the different nations is important. In this regard, 
comparative studies of welfare attitudes in Russia 
and Europe can make a valuable contribution to 
mutual understanding.
Report contents
Drawing on data from the eighth round of the ESS, fielded in 2016/17, the report presents welfare attitudes 
in Russia and Europe, thus facilitating their comparison. It covers two main topics: public support for 
proposed changes to social protection systems, and public support for current social policies targeted at 
specific vulnerable groups. The latter includes income redistribution and the poor, unemployment benefits 
and the unemployed, public pensions and the elderly, childcare and working parents, and the accessibility to 
social rights for migrants.
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policies take an important role in the discussion 
about migration and economic conditions as 
they are seen as an incentive for migrants to 
come to a country or as a burden for a country’s 
economy. At the same time, these trends put the 
sustainability of social policies under pressure 
and thus bring back to the political agenda 
discussions about policy reforms.1 
The ESS asks respondents for their opinions 
about several options for welfare reform. 
Section 1. Opinions about  
proposed welfare reforms
Reforming the welfare state: most popular 
in Eastern and Southern regions
In many welfare states, the challenges posed by 
the nearly universal trends of growing inequality, 
migration, ageing, globalisation and digitalisation 
of work have been further aggravated by the 
recent economic crisis. This had implications 
for the relations between countries: social 
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Figure 1. Preferences for a full turn to means-tested benefits, a basic income scheme 
and activation policies 
Source: European Social Survey Round 8
Notes: Means Tested: percentage of respondents being in favour or strongly in favour of benefits directed only to the poor; 
Activation: percentage of respondents being in favour or strongly in favour of the government spending more on education 
and training programmes for the unemployed at the cost of reducing unemployment benefit; Basic Income: percentage of 
respondents being in favour or strongly in favour of having a basic income scheme. All questions were answered on a 4-point 
scale: ‘strongly against’, ‘against’, ‘in favour’ or ‘strongly in favour’. The age groups were defined as born before or in 1975 (the 
older) and after 1975 (the younger). This categorises people as having been politically socialised before or after the fall of 
communism.
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One proposal is to introduce a universal basic 
income: a scheme that would provide a flat-rate 
cash transfer to all citizens irrespective of their 
previous contributions and present situation. 
The aim of a universal basic income scheme is 
to gradually replace all other forms of transfer. 
This proposal has gained a lot of traction with 
policymakers and academics recently, and at 
present several experiments are underway in 
European countries. Another proposal is to 
make all social transfers and services needs 
based. While practically all European countries 
use means testing to channel resources to 
people in need, this usually accounts for only a 
small fraction of total welfare spending, as most 
welfare benefits are allocated based on previous 
contributions or the principle of universality.2 
Thus, means testing all benefits would be 
a radical proposal for many ESS countries, 
especially the Eastern and Southern European 
ones where the principle of means testing was 
only introduced in the 1990s. The third option 
proposes spending more on education and 
training of the unemployed at the expense of 
cutting down on unemployment benefits. This 
approach is usually referred to as ‘activation 
policies’ and has already been implemented in 
many European countries.
The ESS data shows that activation policies 
attract the strongest support in a large majority of 
countries, while a complete turn to means testing 
is the least popular idea (see Figure 1). With 
regard to a universal basic income, people have 
contrasting views: about half of the population 
is in favour of such a system, while the rest is 
opposed to it. The countries in which people are 
the least in favour of this scheme are Norway, 
Switzerland and Sweden, whereas the countries 
where people are most in favour are Lithuania 
and Russia. The latter two, together with Hungary 
and Slovenia, are also the only countries where 
a basic income is the most popular social policy 
reform overall. 
Given that each of these four countries are 
former communist states marked by universal 
welfare provision, the most likely conclusion 
is that the legacy of a universal welfare state 
leads to the acceptance of a basic income 
scheme. However, whilst in Norway and Sweden 
social policy is also organised on the basis of 
a universal welfare state, these countries are 
among those with the lowest support for a basic 
income scheme.
Furthermore, we cannot find a marked difference 
if we divide the population into two age groups: 
an older group that lived during communism in 
the East or during the heyday of the welfare state 
in the West, and a younger group that was raised 
in the globalised world led by liberal economic 
principles. However, the ESS data shows that 
in almost all countries, the younger age group 
is more supportive of activation and a universal 
basic income than the older age group. The older 
group, on the other hand, is more in favour of 
the more traditional means-tested social policy 
programmes than the younger.
We can identify some differences between 
European regions regarding welfare policy 
preferences: while in most Northern and 
Western European countries people clearly 
favour activation policies over other options, in 
most Southern and Eastern European countries 
people do not show substantial differences 
concerning their preferences for the three policy 
proposals. As already mentioned, some Eastern 
European countries–Russia, Lithuania, Hungary 
and Slovenia–stand out, with more than 60 per 
cent of the population being in favour of a basic 
income scheme. In Russia, Lithuania, Hungary 
and Italy the support for all three proposed 
reforms surpasses the 50 per cent threshold 
among all age groups, which may indicate 
widespread dissatisfaction with the existing 
systems.
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Percentage of people feeling it likely they will not have enough money in the next 12 months
Financial insecurity and support for basic 
income are high in Eastern and Southern 
Europe
If it is not the legacy of a universal welfare state, 
then what makes people in Russia and Lithuania 
prefer a basic income scheme more than people 
in Norway and Sweden do? Over 45 per cent of 
Russian and Lithuanian respondents think that 
they are not likely to have enough money for their 
household necessities in the next 12 months. 
In Norway and Sweden, less than 13 per cent 
of respondents share this fear. This relationship 
generally holds true for the sample of European 
countries: the stronger the concern for future 
unstable economic conditions in a country, the 
stronger the preference for a basic income  
scheme (see Figure 2). 
With a few exceptions, we can identify the different 
regions in the figure: the Nordic countries are 
distinguished by low to medium support for a 
basic income while the fear for not having enough 
money is low; in Western European countries, 
the fear is slightly stronger as is the support for 
a basic income; in Eastern Europe, the fear is 
relatively high as well as the support for a basic 
income; while the Southern European countries 
are characterized by having a strong fear but a 
comparatively low (but still strong) support for a 
basic income scheme. Russia and Lithuania form a 
group of their own, distinguished by a strong fear 
of not having enough money in the future, as well 
as strong support for a basic income scheme.
Source: European Social Survey Round 8
Notes: Percentage of respondents in favour or strongly in favour of a basic income scheme, answered on a 4-point scale: 
‘strongly against’, ‘against’, ‘in favour’ or ‘strongly in favour’. Percentage of people feeling it likely or very likely they will not have 
enough money to cover household necessities in the next 12 months, answered on a 4-point scale: ‘not at all likely’, ‘not very 
likely’, ‘likely’ or ‘very likely’. Correlation across all countries: r=0.76, excluding Russia and Lithuania: r=0.59.
Figure 2. Support for basic income scheme vs. perceived unstable financial future
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6  Russian versus European welfare attitudes
Figure 3 shows that there is only a weak 
relationship between the actual level of income 
inequality, measured by the Gini index, and 
support for redistribution. While the Southern 
European countries have a high level of 
income inequality paired with strong support 
for redistribution, and the Nordic countries are 
characterized by a low inequality and an average 
to low support for redistribution, the Eastern 
European countries are scattered around all 
levels of inequality and support for redistribution. 
Russia is marked by high inequality and 
comparatively low support for redistribution.
Section 2. Solidarity with  
people in need
Solidarity with the poor is high all over 
Europe
Solidarity with poor people, measured as the 
agreement with the statement ‘the government 
should take measures to reduce income 
inequality’,  receives strong support all over 
Europe. In all countries except for the Czech 
Republic, more than 60 per cent of the 
population are in favour of redistribution. 
Figure 3. Support for redistribution vs. Gini Coefficient
Source: European Social Survey Round 8, The Standardized World Income Inequality Database 2018
Notes: The percentage of people in favour of redistribution is measured by the percentage of people who agree or strongly 
agree with the statement: ‘The government should take measures to reduce differences in income levels’. Answers were given 
on a 5-point scale: ‘agree strongly’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’ or ‘disagree strongly’. The correlation for all 
countries is r=0.33. When excluding Eastern Europe, Russia and Israel, the correlation increases to r=0.53.
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Russians and Eastern Europeans are less 
confident that social benefits lead to more 
equality
If we look at how people perceive the 
effectiveness of the social benefits system in 
their country–i.e., whether they believe that 
social benefits will lead to more equality–we 
again find regional patterns, but not a strong 
overall relationship. People support the idea 
that the government is responsible for reducing 
income inequality independently of whether 
they think the government’s social services will 
be successful (see Figure 4). People in the 
Nordic countries are quite confident that social 
benefits will lead to more equality, whereas 
people in the Eastern European countries are 
at the other end of the scale. Russia stands out 
as a distinctive case, with only a quarter of the 
population believing in the equalising effects of 
their welfare state, which may also contribute 
to Russians not being as favourable of the idea 
of income redistribution as one would expect, 
given the high level of inequality in this country. 
Source: European Social Survey Round 8
Notes: The preference for redistribution is measured by the agreement with the statement: ‘The government should take 
measures to reduce differences in income levels’. The belief in the effectiveness of the social benefits system is measured 
by the agreement with the statement: ‘Social benefits and services in [country] lead to a more equal society’. Both questions 
were answered on a 5-point scale: ‘agree strongly’, ‘agree’, ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’ or ‘disagree strongly’. The 
numbers refer to the percentage of people who agree or strongly agree with the respective statement. The correlation between 
the two variables amounts to r=-0.08.
Figure 4. Average support for redistribution vs. the percentage of people who believe 
that social benefits/services lead to a more equal society
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8  Russian versus European welfare attitudes
Despite this concern, we find that all over 
Europe, people think that it is the government’s 
responsibility to provide both a decent standard 
of living for the old, as well as childcare services 
for working parents (see Figure 5). However, the 
data also shows that in all countries, except for 
Germany, Slovenia and Lithuania, support for 
the elderly is slightly higher than for childcare 
services. While in the Eastern European and 
Nordic countries (except for Iceland), both services 
are supported to about the same degree (these 
countries lie close to the diagonal in Figure 5), the 
Western European countries (except for Germany) 
support benefits for the elderly more than childcare 
services (these countries lie above the diagonal 
in Figure 5). Similar to the Netherlands and Israel, 
in Russia, support for the elderly is considerably 
stronger than support for childcare.
No evidence for the ‘grey peril’ in Europe and 
Russia: the public supports welfare for the 
elderly and the young 
All over Europe, countries are confronted with 
an ageing society. Some researchers and media 
postulate therefore a ‘grey peril’: the more old 
people there are in the population, the higher is 
their political clout, leading to an increase in social 
benefits and services that are directed to the 
elderly, such as pensions or health care.3  As social 
expenditure is considered to have reached its 
upper limits in many countries, increasing spending 
on the elderly may be seen as being achieved 
at the expense of services directed to younger 
cohorts, such as childcare. 
Figure 5. Preferences for government responsibility for the elderly vs. preferences for 
government responsibility for child care services for working parents
Source: European Social Survey Round 8
Notes: Both questions were answered on an 11-point scale that ranges from 0 to 10, where 0 stands for ‘should not be 
the government’s responsibility at all’ and 10 stands for ‘should be entirely the government’s responsibility’. The diagonal 
represents equal support for both social services. The correlation between the two variables equals r=0.70.
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Concerns about the work ethic of 
unemployed people do not undermine 
solidarity towards them
While the majority of Europeans are in favour  
of overhauling the unemployment support 
system with a stronger emphasis on activation 
(see Figure 1), this does not automatically imply 
a lack of solidarity with unemployed people.                  
Figure 6 helps to illustrate this point. It compares 
the average levels of solidarity with the 
unemployed between two groups of people: those 
who think that unemployed people do not really try 
to find jobs, and those who are neutral or disagree 
with this idea. As expected, in all countries, those 
who have negative attitudes also tend to show 
less solidarity. However, it is remarkable that in 
none of the countries does the average support 
score fall below the midpoint, even among people 
with doubts about the work ethic of unemployed 
people. In other words, people in Europe firmly 
believe in social rights for the unemployed, no 
matter how ‘deserving’ they are considered to be.4 
Russia stands out in this respect by one of the 
largest gaps in solidarity between the two groups, 
as well as by overall lower levels of solidarity with 
the unemployed.
Source: European Social Survey Round 8
Notes: groups with positive/neutral and negative images of the unemployed are defined based on the question that asked to 
what extent the respondents agree with the statement that ‘most unemployed people do not really try to find a job’. People with 
positive/neutral images are those who answered ‘neither agree nor disagree’, ‘disagree’ or ‘disagree strongly’. People with a 
negative image are those who answered ‘agree strongly’ or ‘agree’.  Solidarity with the unemployed is defined by the question 
which asked respondents to what extent they agree with the statement that is the government’s responsibility to ensure the 
living standards of the unemployed. Responses were measured on an 11-point scale that ranges from 0 to 10, where 0 
denotes ‘should not be the government’s responsibility at all’, and 10, ‘should be entirely the government’s responsibility’.    
Figure 6. Solidarity with the unemployed among people with positive/neutral and 
negative images of the unemployed
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10  Russian versus European welfare attitudes
the opposite is true. People in the Nordic 
countries have more positive opinions about 
the living conditions of unemployed people, but 
nonetheless they express strong solidarity. In 
Eastern Europe, people’s perceptions of the 
living standards of the unemployed are low, but 
solidarity is nonetheless weak. Russia is a clear 
outlier: people here are the most dissatisfied 
with the living conditions of the unemployed, 
but this does not lead to strong solidarity. 
One possible explanation is that Russians 
might not have a favourable opinion about 
the general living standards in their country 
either: as shown in Figure 2, the proportion of 
people who anticipate financial difficulties is 
one of the highest and Russians also have the 
lowest evaluations of the living standards of 
pensioners.5
Comparatively low support for the 
unemployed in Russia, even though the 
living standards of the unemployed is 
perceived as very low
General perceptions of the living standards of 
unemployed people may also influence how 
much solidarity the public shows towards 
them: countries where the perceived living 
conditions are low, also exhibit higher average 
levels of support (see Figure 7). This negative 
relationship is observed within each country 
except for Austria. Overall, on these two 
dimensions, four regional groups can be 
distinguished. Southern Europeans have some 
of the lowest evaluations of the living standards 
of their unemployed compatriots combined with 
a strong solidarity, while for Western Europeans 
Figure 7. Perceived standards of living vs. solidarity with the unemployed
Source: European Social Survey Round 8
Notes: the perceived living standards of the unemployed are measured by a question that asked:  ‘What do you think overall 
about the standard of living of people who are unemployed?’ The answers were recorded on a scale from 0 to 10 where 0 
stands for ‘extremely bad’ and 10 means ‘extremely good’. The correlation between the two variables is r=-0.3, excluding 
Russia r=-0.37.
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Eastern Europeans and Russians are the 
most reserved about the social rights of 
migrants
The ESS Welfare Attitudes module also 
addresses the question of the conditions under 
which people migrating from other countries 
‘should obtain the same rights to social benefits 
and services as citizens already living here’. 
The results indicate that Eastern Europeans 
are particularly opposed to the social rights 
of immigrants (so-called welfare chauvinism6): 
in each of these countries, two-fifths or more 
of respondents state that immigrants should 
either never be granted access to the same 
social benefits as the native-born citizens or only 
be granted them after becoming citizens (see 
Figure 8). At the same time, in these countries, 
less than a fifth of people are in favour of 
granting equal access on arrival or after a year, 
irrespective of whether the people concerned 
have worked. This pattern of attitudes also holds 
for Russia, indicating that Russians are similarly 
relatively reserved about the social rights of 
immigrants. In the Western, Southern and 
especially Nordic European countries, people 
appear to be more open to the idea of universal 
social rights. There are, however, exceptions: 
large proportions of people in the Netherlands, 
Italy, Finland and Austria are as restrictive as the 
Eastern Europeans in general.
Source: European Social Survey Round 8
Notes: the precise formulation of the question is: ‘Thinking of people coming to live in [country] from other countries, when do 
you think they should obtain the same rights to social benefits and services as citizens already living here?’ Labels in brackets 
indicate regions: [S] stands for Southern Europe, [N] for Northern Europe, [W] for Western Europe and [E] for Eastern Europe.
Figure 8. Preferences regarding the granting of social rights to immigrants 
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two groups of countries here: a smaller one 
consisting of Poland, Hungary, Lithuania, the 
Czech Republic, Finland and Russia where 
the proportion of migrants is small, but welfare 
chauvinism is high; and the rest of the countries. 
Interestingly, in both Switzerland and Israel, 
more than a quarter of the population is foreign-
born, but a substantially smaller proportion of 
Swiss respondents are explicitly critical about 
extending welfare rights to immigrants than it is 
the case in Israel.
Unfamiliarity with migrants contributes 
to the high welfare chauvinism in Eastern 
Europe
Some researchers have argued that people 
are more negative towards migrants when 
they have limited contact with them.7 The 
results presented in Figure 9 indeed indicate 
that welfare chauvinism is higher in countries 
where the levels of migration (measured as 
the proportion of the population not born in 
the country) are lower. It is possible to detect 
Figure 9. Percentage of foreign-born population vs. percentage critical of social rights 
for immigrants
Source: European Social Survey Round 8
Notes: Respondents critical of social rights are those who answered that immigrants from other countries should ‘never’ or 
only after they ‘have become a citizen’ have access to the same social rights as citizens already living in the country. The 
correlation between the two variables is r=-0.46.
Share of total population not born in country
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In Russia and Eastern Europe, welfare 
systems are not seen as effective and 
welfare chauvinism is high
According to the ‘ethnic competition theory’,8 
welfare chauvinism might be explained as 
deriving from the fear of competition for scarce 
welfare resources. To test this, Figure 10 plots 
the proportion of people who are in favour of 
restricting migrants’ access to social benefits 
against the average perceptions of how 
effective the country’s social protection system 
is in preventing widespread poverty. There 
certainly appears to be a link between the two, 
and the general picture indicates that people 
are more restrictive in countries where welfare 
systems are deemed to be less effective: 
mainly Eastern European countries and Russia. 
However, when looking at the old EU member 
states alone, a reverse tendency becomes 
visible, with respondents being somewhat more 
critical in countries where welfare systems are 
perceived to be more effective in preventing 
widespread poverty. 
Source: European Social Survey Round 8
Notes: Respondents critical of social rights are those who answered that immigrants from other countries should ‘never’ or 
only after they ‘have become a citizen’ have access to the same social rights as citizens already living in the country. Evaluation 
of poverty prevention was measured by answers to the statement: ‘Please tell me to what extent you agree or disagree that 
social benefits and services prevent widespread poverty’. Answers were measured on a 5-point scale (recoded here) ranging 
from 1 = ‘disagree completely’ to 5 = ‘agree completely’. The correlation between the two variables when all countries are 
included is r=-0.46. The correlation between the two variables for the ‘old’ EU member states (excluding Italy), Iceland, 
Norway and Switzerland (bottom right cluster in the figure) is r=0.61
Figure 10. Evaluation of the effects of social policy on widespread poverty vs. the 
percentage critical of social rights for immigrants
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14  Russian versus European welfare attitudes
income is favoured more by the young even 
though the difference is not strong enough 
to change the preference structure in most 
countries. Thus, support for policy reform will 
most likely increase over time. However, a basic 
income is already the preferred social policy 
scheme today for people in Russia, Lithuania, 
Hungary and Slovenia. Except for Slovenia, 
these are the countries where people are most 
sceptical about the efficiency of the existing 
welfare system.
We also find that with regard to welfare 
opinions, countries often cluster in line with 
geographic regions, reflecting the fact that 
neighbouring countries tend to have similar 
levels of economic development and welfare 
systems. The least homogenous is the Eastern 
European group, presumably because in the 
last 30 years the social policy reforms have 
rendered these welfare systems more as 
hybrids of different European regimes, rather 
than as an idiosyncratic regime type.9  
Russians’ attitudes, while not radically different 
from those of Europeans, are nonetheless 
quite distinctive in some respects. In 
general, Russians appear to favour universal 
programmes, such as a universal basic income 
(everyone would be entitled to a basic income) 
or old-age pensions (everyone will get older), 
but they are considerably less supportive 
of programmes directed at specific needy 
people, such as the unemployed or working 
parents, while also being particularly restrictive 
of immigrants’ social rights. At the same time, 
Russians are relatively sceptical about the 
capacities of their welfare system, as evidenced 
by the low satisfaction with the living standards 
of the unemployed and the achieved level of 
poverty reduction. This may help to understand 
why, unlike most European countries, each 
of the three proposed social policy schemes 
has the approval of more than half of Russia’s 
population.
Conclusion
The findings of the report allow us to draw some 
general conclusions regarding people’s welfare 
attitudes in Russia and Europe. Despite the 
mounting challenges, the idea of the welfare 
state appears to be highly popular, with the 
majority of people in all ESS countries being 
strongly in favour of the redistribution principle 
and the key social protection programmes, 
including old-age provision, childcare services 
and to a lesser extent unemployment provision. 
Moreover, these attitudes hold even when 
people are sceptical about their government’s 
ability to meet the objectives of the welfare 
state and when they doubt beneficiaries’ 
work ethics. Against this background, the 
widespread welfare chauvinism is somewhat 
counterintuitive, which is particularly apparent 
in the Eastern European countries and several 
others. However, there are reasons to anticipate 
that opposition to migrants’ social rights will 
diminish over time, as we find that people in 
countries with higher proportions of foreign-
born citizens are the most receptive towards 
universal provision, irrespective of citizenship 
status.
The general support for the welfare state does 
not preclude the perceived need for reform, as 
evidenced by the high proportions of people 
supporting different scenarios for social policy 
reform: a universal basic income and activation 
of the unemployed. The turn to complete means 
testing of welfare provision seems to be the 
least popular of the three proposed options in 
most countries, presumably as it would exclude 
the middle and upper income groups. The idea 
of a basic income is not (yet) supported by the 
majority in most countries, conceivably due to 
uncertainty surrounding the effects this radical 
measure could entail. However, activation 
policies seem to have strong support in all 
countries. It is noticeable that the older age 
group favours complete means testing more 
than the younger age group does, while a basic 
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